This is the norm for programmes launched by the government. Let’s consider Pradhan Mantri Kisan Urja Suraksha Evam Utthan Mahabhiyan (PM KUSUM), a scheme introduced in 2019 to increase farmer incomes as well as decarbonise the agricultural sector through solar irrigation. The first phase of PM KUSUM, between July and December 2019, was marked by pilots to test how its different components—such as subsidy rates and feed-in tariffs (FiTs), that is, the price at which electricity distribution companies buy back renewable energy from the farmer—would work on the ground.

The scheme has since gathered momentum. As of June 2023, a total of 113.08 MW capacity of small solar power plants—each of up to 2 MW capacity—and 2.45 lakh pumps have been reported installed or solarised to date. At COP 26, the Government of India set an ambitious goal to achieve net-zero emissions by 2070. India has also committed to achieving 50 percent of its cumulative electric power installed from non-fossil fuel sources, which includes solar. While agriculture comes second in total emissions, there is scope to do this without placing the burden on farmers. PM KUSUM is a step in this direction.   

With its trajectory of pilot to scale, it can be assumed that any glitches with this scheme would have been sorted out during the pilot phase, before it was promoted on a nationwide scale. But it was not so straightforward. 

Pilots are not always sufficient

While pilots are useful, they run a risk—when the success of isolated cases is extrapolated on a larger scale, they can sometimes have unintended consequences. This is especially true of interventions in the agriculture and water sector. For instance, farm ponds gained popularity a few years ago. These were small farm-scale interventions that were set up to provide farmers in arid areas access to water during the rabi (winter) and kharif (summer) seasons so that they could grow a second and third crop. At a small scale, ponds built on a few farms are usually effective and rarely have any adverse impact. However, farm ponds built across larger land areas or in greater number can lead to unexpected issues such as water inequity and privatisation of water.

In the case of PM KUSUM, here are three problems that the pilots presented:

1. Schemes like PM KUSUM are ‘gold-plated’, which means that they are offered at highly lucrative terms. For instance, the subsidies provided to farmers by the state and the centre cover 70 percent of the cost of the programme. However, these subsidies are only part of the pilot programme, not the scheme itself. The problem with gold-plating schemes and making them cover such a large part of the cost is that while there may be immediate buy-in from the farmers, there is no real change in long-term behaviour, for without the subsidies the farmers may not opt for the scheme. In addition, subsidies are a huge burden on the government exchequer and are therefore not sustainable in the long run.
2. Biophysical (rainfall, soil conditions, aquifers) and socio-economic (landholding size, religion/caste, household income) conditions vary in a diverse landscape like India, so the external validity of the results of these pilots is questionable. There may be contingencies that are difficult to anticipate in the planning stage of a project.
3. Insights from most pilots suggest that farmers take months, if not years, to understand how schemes work and to trust the payment process associated with them. When we asked farmers in Tamil Nadu’s Coimbatore district about government schemes, their knowledge was limited on several fronts. Some weren’t aware of the schemes, and while others were aware, they didn’t know how to apply for them. This indicates that pilots often work with a small group of possibly ‘progressive or early adopted farmers’. And even for this group, the shift from knowledge to practice in any sort of tangible way often occurs at a longer time scale of five to seven years. This is far more than the average programme evaluation scale of just a few months.

Hence, empirical data from these early pilots are insufficient to scale large projects in a country with contexts as varied as India. Our research found that modelling exercises can anticipate impact more comprehensively instead.

What is agent-based modelling?

Modelling, in the form of simulations, can provide a preview of potential outcomes. A model is a simplified representation of reality, often designed to help explain, understand, or predict certain aspects of that reality. The effectiveness of a model usually depends on how well it approximates the real-world system or scenario it is meant to represent.    

While pilots are actual physical interventions and require time and high investment in resources for implementation, models are often a quicker and less expensive way of understanding the potential impacts of interventions. They can be simply created on a computer using tools that require expertise, but not as much investment as the pilots themselves.

With respect to solar irrigation, agent-based modelling (ABM) can help us understand the choices farmers are likely to make when presented with the income-enhancing options that solar pumps offer. ABM is used to simulate the actions and interactions of autonomous agents (individuals or collective entities such as organisations or groups) in order to assess their effects on the system as a whole.

There are two potential outcomes in such a scenario: (a) Farmers without access to electricity and irrigation can finally pump the water they need to cultivate more, or (b) farmers with access to both electricity and irrigation can sell the excess energy back to the grid through the feed-in tariff. And yet, there is a combination of factors—local biophysical, socio-economic, and sociopolitical—that determine what the farmers would probably do. 

We conducted an ABM exercise to ascertain how farmers were likely to respond to the PM KUSUM scheme. Here, the ‘agent’ is the farmer. The modelling framework is based on the premise that individual farmers decide which crops to cultivate, driven by the need to maximise profit and minimise risk. The crops they choose to cultivate depend on:

1. Existing policies, such as access to strong procurement systems and a guaranteed minimum support price (MSP).
2. The constraints they face around land, water, and electricity.

We chose six case study sites based on farmers’ access to water, land, and electricity. In this article, we discuss our findings from one site.

Case study: Bathinda, Punjab

In Punjab’s Bathinda district, most farmers follow one of three cropping systems: rice–wheat (rice in the kharif season, followed by wheat in the rabi season), cotton–potato, and kinnow (a citrus fruit tree).

Among these groupings, the rice–wheat cropping system requires the most water, followed by cotton–potato, and then kinnow. In this district, availability of land is the major constraint, since approximately 99 percent of cropland is already under irrigation. Most farmers follow irrigation-intensive rice–wheat cropping patterns and can neither bring more land under irrigation nor increase the amount of water they pump.

Farmers in Bathinda do not face an energy limitation as the Punjab government provides free or heavily subsidised electricity to farmers. Their shallow tube wells are powered by grid-connected electricity, and, on average, they receive four to eight hours of electricity every day during the kharif and rabi seasons. This is comparable to the average of four to five hours of electricity that solar panels provide, albeit with a little more certainty in timings.

In terms of water access, groundwater in Punjab is held in massive alluvial aquifers; hence, the pinch of groundwater decline has not yet been felt. Even in low-rainfall years, there is no water scarcity. Studies have shown that the area under rice cultivation is completely unaffected by rainfall variability in Punjab.          

Given that irrigation is at maximum capacity, the question now is whether it could decrease enough to make a dent in the current rate of overexploitation. What crop choices are farmers likely to make? How will their profit change? How will the groundwater status change?

The ABM suggests that a ‘sustainable transition’ is theoretically possible

We define a sustainable transition as an event where a farmer reduces water use while increasing income and either reducing or maintaining the same level of risk.

A farmer growing rice–wheat has three options.

1. Switch to growing cotton–potato: From an income perspective, this option is profitable and reduces water consumption marginally.
2. Switch to growing kinnow: This option reduces water consumption by a large amount but increases income marginally.
3. Continue growing rice–wheat: This option keeps income at current levels, which is lower compared to other crop choices, but water consumption remains dangerously high.

It is theoretically possible for a farmer to move from growing rice–wheat or cotton–potato to kinnow. Our calculations suggest that these transitions are both economically viable and less water intensive. Farmers will earn more through the sale of solar energy and crops while significantly cutting down on their water use as kinnow requires lower levels of irrigation compared with rice–wheat and cotton–potato.

However, both rice–wheat and cotton–potato farmers are unlikely to budge from their current cropping patterns at least in the medium term, even if solar irrigation results in a small increase in their earnings.

There are two types of risk that could dissuade farmers from making a sustainable transition:

1. Price-related risk, which crops without MSP are prone to since they are subject to market forces. What this means is that there are no guaranteed prices for kinnow or potato. If there is a shortage of these products in the market, farmers might gain from an increase in price; however, if supply is greater than demand, it is likely to result in a price crash, affecting the farmer’s home economics. These price variations are unpredictable and hence carry a huge risk.
2. Cultural risks, where farmers are hesitant to move away from growing crops that they are familiar with. Cultivating a new crop requires knowledge and expertise, and access to new input/service providers. Farmers are often path-dependent, which means that the cultivation of a certain crop using certain practices is dominant and self-reinforcing. To move to a new crop would require getting over that cultural barrier, which is challenging.  

Hence, the introduction of solar irrigation may not result in sustainable transitions in Bathinda, as the agent/farmer will continue growing rice–wheat. Solar irrigation might only marginally increase profits, given the initial capital cost that the farmer will have to incur for the solar pump. This choice is likely to result in continued over-abstraction of groundwater resources—as the crops stay the same, so does the high irrigation water requirement.

These choices are ‘locked-in’ despite the clear advantages associated with cultivating a different crop. Our sensitivity analysis showed that at low FiTs and low subsidies, it is not profitable for a rice–wheat farmer to continue growing the same with solar irrigation. In other words, the adoption of solar irrigation itself is likely to be low if farmers remain risk-averse. Only when the FiT crosses a threshold of INR 5 per kilowatt-hour and comes with a subsidy of 70 percent will it be profitable for the farmer to grow rice–wheat after switching to solar. However, it is important to note that switching to cotton–potato and kinnow is profitable for the farmer across most FiTs and subsidies. But earlier descriptions of the farmer’s perceptions of price-related and cultural risks show that this is a highly improbable outcome.

Simulations are not always foolproof

It’s important to note that there will be contingencies or scenarios that modelling will fail to predict because human behaviour is not perfectly predictable. Additionally, there may be ‘black swan’ events, which are developments in these ecosystems that could completely change the trajectory, rendering the outcomes we have outlined here void. For instance, a rural entrepreneur could set up a kinnow-based jam factory and there might be a steady demand for kinnow, which derisks farmers from economic shocks and is environmentally more suitable for the Bathinda landscape.

There are other limitations. One is that the study does not take into account how farmers share knowledge among themselves during the implementation of a programme. This peer-to-peer learning is an important factor that affects their behaviour. The study is also constrained by a focus on crop transitions and not irrigation technologies, even though different irrigation technologies will result in different water savings when switching from one crop to another. Additionally, it only considers income from crop cultivation and not off-farm sources such as livestock rearing.

However, modelling work still holds value. Simulations are particularly important before the large-scale rollout of programmes so that we can account for inadvertent consequences during the planning process itself. The nature of federalism in India dictates that the central government design programmes and state governments implement them. However, given how India is geographically, socio-economically, and culturally diverse, there is merit in finding ways to let state governments inform programme design. Simulations like this one can be powerful tools that allow state governments to inform policy design, and subsequently more effective programme implementation.

To ensure the optimal allocation of government funds, it is essential to rely on simulations. These tools enable us to model various scenarios meticulously, providing invaluable insights for making informed decisions about public spending. By employing simulations, we can forecast outcomes more accurately, identify potential pitfalls, and maximise the effectiveness of each rupee spent. This approach is crucial for responsible fiscal management and the achievement of desired policy outcomes.

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Know more

• Read this article to know how carbon credits could be a path to sustainable agriculture in India. 
• Read this report to learn more about the authors’ agent-based modelling study.
• Read this article to understand why farmers are reluctant to swap paddy for kinnow. 

Note: Districts of West Bengal decided not to join the program. Currently only 112 districts are part of ADP. However, in our analysis we cover the CSR spend across all the 115 districts that were identified at the launch of ADP in 2018.

NITI AAYOG identified 115 districts across 28 states based upon composite indicators from Health and Nutrition, Education, Agriculture & Water Resources, Financial Inclusion & Skill development and Basic Infrastructure which have an impact on HDI. In the five years of ADP implementation, the overall composite score has improved by over 72%. Maximum change has been in the areas of Education, Agriculture & Water Resources, and Healthcare.

The broad outlines of ADP are Convergence (of Central & State Schemes), Collaboration (of Central, State level Officers & District Collectors), and Competition among the districts driven by a spirit of mass movement. Districts in the ADP are prodded and encouraged to first catch up with the best district within their state (districts in the frontier), and subsequently aspire to become one of the best in the country, by competing with, and learning from others in the spirit of competitive & cooperative federalism.As of August 2023, the overall composite scores of the Aspirational Districts (ADs) in the north-eastern states and a large number of ADs in the states of Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh had an overall composite score of less than or equal to 50, they are now working towards closing the distance with districts that are in the frontier. These states also have a higher share of ADs.

Despite the government advocating CSR investment in ADs, only about 2.15%* of the total CSR during 2014-22 has been invested in these districts, which houses more than 15% of India’s population. In FY 2021-22, CSR spend in ADs increased by more than 50% from the previous year.

More than half (53%) of the total CSR funds are spent on ADs in these five states—Madhya Pradesh (448 Cr.), Andhra Pradesh (387 Cr.), Jharkhand (328 Cr.), Chhattisgarh (301 Cr.) and Gujarat (291 Cr.).

Also, over 3/4th (78%) of the CSR spend in ADs has been across these four top sectors (Education, Healthcare, Rural Development, and Environment Sustainability). During the COVID-19 years, CSR spend in Education and Healthcare increased by more than 70%. A five-fold increase in CSR spend was seen in Environment Sustainability projects between 2020-21 and 2021-22.

In Jan 2023, five years after the launch of ADP, the government of India launched ‘The Aspirational Blocks Programme (ABP)’. This Programme focuses on improving governance to enhance the quality of life of citizens in the most difficult and underdeveloped blocks of India.500 blocks from across 27 states and 4 Union Territories of India were identified to steer and drive the change in aspirational blocks by monitoring key socio-economic indicators categorised under major sectors such as Health and Nutrition, Education, Agriculture and Allied Services, Drinking Water and Sanitation, Financial Inclusion, Basic Infrastructure, and overall Social Development. With the launch of ABP, more than 45% of districts in India (~350 districts) are now either part of ADP and/or districts of ABP.

How have the 115 ADs transformed across various thematic areas in the last five years? Which districts have been consistently improving across all thematic areas? How much CSR funding have they received? Which companies are funding these ADs? How do we strengthen investments at the bottom of our pyramid and help these districts reach their transformation goals? Does a 2% allocation of the total CSR investment suffice to facilitate the transformation of aspirational districts?

To know more about ADP & ABP and CSR Spend in ADs and districts of ABP, explore our data assets on Aspirational Districts.

*According to the direct attribution to districts available on MCA CSR portal—a large chunk of CSR remains unattributed to any particular district.

This article was originally published on India Data Insights.

This article was updated on 17th January, 2024 to include a note on the districts that were considered for the analysis.

Star ratings have the potential to influence consumer choice, provided that there is greater public awareness about their significance. Therefore, the BEE has also produced several videos that encourage consumers to buy five star–rated appliances to save on electricity bills.

But what do these energy-efficient appliances mean for India’s long-term energy goals? 

India’s increasing energy demand

India is the world’s third-largest energy-consuming nation. While fans and lighting are the primary consumers of power in rural regions, air conditioners, refrigerators, and geysers account for a significant proportion of urban India’s power consumption.

India’s energy consumption has doubled in the last two decades.

Since 2000, rising incomes, improved standards of living, and urbanisation have been driving up the demand for energy-intensive products in the country. The country’s energy consumption has thus doubled in the last two decades. Current estimates indicate that India’s energy demand is expected to peak between 2021 and 2030, driven primarily by continuing economic expansion, population growth, and industrialisation. Among the key sectors contributing to this escalating energy demand, residential consumption plays a significant role. In 2020-21, it accounted for 26 percent of total electricity consumption, trailing only the industrial sector’s share of 41 percent.

As the energy consumption stemming from residential buildings is projected to increase by more than eight times by 2050, the need to devise energy-efficient strategies tailored to the residential sector becomes a paramount concern, crucial as this is for accommodating burgeoning demand as well as ensuring sustainable growth.

How can the energy labelling programme help India’s climate goals?

Energy efficiency labelling has emerged as a pivotal policy tool in India’s arsenal to address the mounting energy demand and deliver the country’s climate goals. India has a target of reducing 1 billion tons of CO₂ by 2030. In 2021-22, the S&L programme led to a remarkable reduction in emissions—approximately 160 million tons, which is 16 percent of the annual national target.

In turn, the energy efficiency of appliances has translated into tangible benefits for consumers, such as reduced electricity bills. While the initial investment in efficient appliances might be relatively higher, this upfront cost is offset by the savings in electricity bills. In 2021-22, this resulted in savings amounting to approximately INR 94,000 crore.

Over time, the cost of the efficient appliances included in global S&L programmes has also declined at an annual rate of 2-3 percent, making them more affordable in comparison to less efficient appliances. This is further supplemented by savings in energy costs through reduction in electricity bills over the appliance’s lifespan, ultimately yielding a net benefit for consumers. A comprehensive analysis by CLASP on lifecycle costs—the costs associated with an appliance over its lifetime—demonstrates that opting for higher-efficiency appliances can lead to savings of up to 17 percent overall, effectively negating the slightly higher initial investment.

For example, purchasing a five star–labelled ceiling fan can result in up to 14 percent savings over the lifespan of the appliance as compared to a fan with a one-star rating. These savings accrue from reduced energy consumption, which translates into lower electricity bills. This makes buying a more energy-efficient fan a cost-effective choice for consumers in the long run.

Recent surveys also highlight a shifting consumer landscape, where energy cost savings become a pivotal determinant in purchasing decisions. 

The need for a more cohesive energy efficiency plan

As India charts its trajectory toward an economically robust and environmentally sustainable future, harnessing the potential of energy-efficient appliances becomes critical. The overall efficiency improvement should be accelerated, and the market should move towards higher-efficiency appliances. This is not only crucial for consumers in the long run but also plays an important role in achieving  broader sustainability and environmental goals. To realise these intended outcomes, the benefits of the S&L programme must be augmented through collaborative efforts involving governments, civil society, and industry stakeholders. The following recommendations outline key steps in that direction:

1. Strengthening states’ role in policy compliance

State-designated bodies are the nodal agencies that bear the responsibility of implementing the S&L programme. They oversee activities related to the monitoring, verification, and enforcement (MVE) of the programme. For example, they conduct market surveys to verify whether the products being sold are compliant with the programme. However, these agencies require capacity building assistance in order to be empowered to play a more robust role in implementing MVE activities. This would include training the inspectors on the methods of market surveillance, survey sample selection, analysis, and reporting. The inspectors should also be trained on the types and nature of non-compliance that could potentially exist in the market.

2. Crafting targeted consumer awareness strategies

At present, consumer awareness regarding the lifecycle costs of energy-efficient appliances is low. Therefore, they are likely to be hesitant about buying these products due to their upfront cost being greater. A concerted effort to make consumers more aware about the S&L programme and its implications will enable the adoption of highly efficient appliances. This effort must include tailored messaging that emphasises the monetary savings, societal advantages, and environmental benefits associated with the use of energy-efficient appliances. Several stakeholders—including the government, civil society, and consumer research groups—have a part to play in disseminating information regarding these products in a manner that is accessible to the average consumer.  

There are lessons to be learned from other schemes, such as the UJALA programme. These lessons can be incorporated to improve consumer awareness about energy efficiency programmes. The programme successfully reduced the retail prices of energy-efficient LED bulbs from INR 300-350 to INR 70-80 per unit.

Working closely with retailers is another pathway to explore. They are a key point of contact for consumers and can influence their decisions in a major way. Collaborating with retailers could involve training them to understand the benefits of labelled appliances and promote the purchase of appliances with higher star ratings.  

3. Fostering behavioural change

Recognising the pivotal role of individual behaviour in catalysing energy transitions, India’s Mission Lifestyle for Environment initiative can act as a facilitator for widespread behavioural change. Given that it promotes sustainable consumption choices, it can act as a key lever in encouraging consumers to conserve energy and purchase efficient appliances. For example, the installation of smart metres in households can provide people with information regarding their energy consumption patterns and help them positively alter their energy consumption. Additionally, automation technologies can further reinforce efficiency, such as using sensors to power down lighting when rooms are unoccupied.

However, governments must underpin these individual measures with a supportive policy framework that actively promotes efficient appliances and energy-saving practices. A key example is the AC @ 24 campaign by the BEE.  It mandated that every air conditioner sold in India should have its default temperature set to 24°C. This means that when a newly purchased AC is switched on for the first time, it should begin cooling to 24°C. For every one degree rise in the AC temperature, up to 6 percent electricity can be saved.

4. Pioneering market transformation initiatives

While the S&L programme is the linchpin, a holistic approach is indispensable to accelerate the adoption of cost-efficient appliances. Providing financing for both the manufacture and purchase of energy-efficient equipment overcomes the barrier of the lack of capital by spreading the initial costs over time. Financial incentives for consumers, such as subsidies or rebates, reduce the upfront costs of highly efficient products, thereby addressing the cost barriers to the consumer.

India’s journey towards energy efficiency is one of strategic importance, not only in combating climate change but also in driving sustainable development. The S&L programme offers an illustration of what can be achieved when governments, civil society, and industry unite to shape a greener, more efficient future. As India strives to cement itself as a global climate leader, its success with the S&L programme demonstrates a tangible path that not only benefits its citizens but also paves the way for a harmonised global response to the climate crisis.

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Know more

• Listen to this podcast on how energy efficiency can enable India’s net-zero pursuit.
• Read this article on India’s renewable energy landscape and what its needs are.

Even in the pre-COVID years, Indians depended heavily on private services, but the situation worsened during the pandemic. Many instances of the private sector charging very high prices for providing healthcare came to light in 2020, 2021, and 2022, which had a catastrophic impact on households. On an average, the clinical cost of treating a COVID-19 patient in a private hospital rose to INR 11,000 per day for the general ward. Many were left in debt after their treatment.

India’s healthcare expenditure

This increase in the healthcare burden is, however, not represented in the official data from the government, which paints a different picture. It highlights that government expenditure on healthcare has increased, resulting in people having to spend less money from their own pocket. In order to substantiate this, the government is emphasising that the percent of public expenditure on healthcare in current health expenditure (CHE) has been increasing and within CHE, out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE) is decreasing.  

According to the National Health Accounts (NHA), CHE refers to “only recurrent expenditures for healthcare purposes net all capital expenditures”. This means expenditure contributed by all union, state, and local government bodies; private entities such as insurance and donors; and so on. The NHA data indicates that the portion of public expenditure on healthcare in relation to CHE was approximately 27 percent in 2016–17. This saw an increase to 33 percent in 2017–18 and further rose to 35 percent in 2019–20. On the other hand, OOPE indicates direct payments made by individuals for any medical service. These are payments not covered by a third party, including the government or any health insurance. The NHA data shows that OOPE in India has been declining steeply. It decreased from 63 percent of CHE in 2016–17 to 55 percent in 2017–18 and has continued to decline. In 2019–20, it was approximately 52 percent.

This trend suggests a rising investment in India’s healthcare by the government, seemingly relieving the burden on the public. However, a closer inspection reveals that this is a simplistic reading.

What is NHA and how does it calculate health data?

Since these health trends are derived from data provided by NHA, it is important to understand what NHA is and how its estimates are calculated.

NHA is an accounting framework that estimates the annual health spending of an economy through a methodology that makes the estimates internationally comparable. It follows the globally used standard framework called System of Health Account (SHA), designed by the World Health Organization.

NHA produces estimates of public expenditure, private expenditure, OOPE, and so on by using the following mechanisms:

1. Government expenditure: NHA uses both union and state budget data and the data collected from the official documents of local bodies such as panchayats and municipal corporations for estimating government expenditure.

2. OOPE: To estimate OOPE, it uses the National Statistical Office’s (NSO) rounds on ‘Social Consumption: Health’ and ‘Consumption Expenditure Survey’(CES). The report also uses data from the Government of India’s ‘National Family Health Survey’ (NFHS).

A major component of OOPE on healthcare is estimated from ‘Social Consumption: Health’ since the survey collects information extensively on utilisation of and expenditure on healthcare, and gathers details of both inpatient and outpatient services along with types of ailments. CES also collects information on expenditure on healthcare; however, it does not do so on utilisation of services and types and incidences of ailments. NFHS is undertaken by the government; it collects household information with a special focus on maternal and child health and nutrition. Along with these data sets, since 2017–18, sales data from IQVIA (an analytics and technology provider based in the USA) has also been used to capture expenditure on vaccines, vitamins, minerals, and other supplements.

3. Total healthcare expenditure: Unlike CHE, total healthcare expenditure (THE) includes both current and capital expenditure on healthcare. While current expenditure means day-to-day operational costs such as services and medicines, capital expenditure indicates long-term costs such as infrastructure development, which could include machines or buildings. Capital goods typically have a lifespan of a few years. This means that spending money on a machine or a building should not be considered as only that year’s expenditure since these assets will be used in the years to follow. Therefore, one has to annualise expenditure on capital goods factoring in its depreciation cost. Since it is technically not feasible to annualise capital expenditure incurred by the providers every year, and thus not possible to eliminate the risk of overcounting, using estimates in proportion to CHE is considered a good practice.

Why this produces inaccurate data

Due to the absence of any nationally representative updated database on OOPE, it is not possible to estimate indicators without error. The magnitude of error would be higher with more outdated databases. Here are some causes of concern:

1. NSO relies on outdated census data

Since it is not possible to cover the entire population of the country for their survey, NSO carries out a sample survey for collecting data. It uses census data for designing sampling frames (the list of individuals the sample survey is drawn from). However, since no new census data has been published after 2011, it is impossible to have an appropriate sampling design and frame for NSO.

2. No new CES has been conducted since 2011

The last CES was carried out in 2011–12. NHA has been using that same old data set for estimating expenditure on therapeutic appliances. Such old data is bound to estimate utilisation and expenditure incorrectly. One may always argue that the magnitude of error for using such an outdated database will not be huge as the item comprises a very negligible proportion of THE or CHE. However, this imposes different challenges. For example, while estimating expenditure on therapeutic appliances for the state of Telangana, which did not exist in 2011–12 and was formed in 2014, one has to make a series of assumptions. 

3. ‘Social Consumption: Health’ data is from the demonetisation year

 A major chunk of the OOPE is estimated using data from ‘Social Consumption: Health’. However, the last NSO ‘Social Consumption: Health’ round was published in 2018. The survey was conducted in 2017–18 with a reference period of one year. This means that the survey collects information on healthcare expenditure incurred during 2016–17, a year in which demonetisation was imposed. As a result, poor and middle-income families (that primarily spend and transact using cash) didn’t have the money to buy food and other necessities. This had a spillover effect on their ability to spend on healthcare.

The same data set has been used for estimating OOPE for the years since then. Although it has been adjusted for inflation and projected population growth in order to produce the estimates, the data doesn’t reflect changes in the demand for healthcare accurately.

The year 2016–17 was an anomaly because of demonetisation, and any approximation based on it is likely to produce incorrect results. It was a period when people were struggling for cash. For many, the usual alternatives didn’t exist: Their savings in cash had no meaning; there was nowhere to borrow from; and, since the economy as a whole was suffering, they perhaps didn’t even have a market to sell their assets and pay for healthcare.

It would therefore be incorrect to assume that people wouldn’t have accessed these options in the subsequent years. So the OOPE is likely to have increased from 2016–17 to 2019–20.

Is the situation likely to change?

The NHA for FY 2020–21 will be published soon, and this round may show a further decline in the share of OOPE in contrast to the increasing share of public expenditure on health due to the absence of a new round of ‘Social Consumption: Health’ and updated information on public expenditure.

Public expenditure on healthcare is lower than the desired level in India. The Union Government’s expenditure on health hovered around 0.4 percent of the GDP for most of the years during 2014–15 to 2018–19, barring 2017–18 when it increased to 0.55 percent followed by a decline.

There was a miniscule increase in allocation for health emergencies in 2021 due to COVID-19, but this was discontinued after two years.

The latest NHA data builds the illusion that everything is fine with India’s public healthcare. Absence of updated data and inaccurate estimation of OOPE shows the government in a good light and allows it to shrug off responsibility and accountability.

What the government needs to do instead is increase allocation for healthcare and collect and publish data in a timebound manner; this will aid the framing of better policies.

Mampi Bose is a faculty member at Azim Premji University. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the organisation they represent.

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Know more

• Read this article to learn how Ayushman Bharat fares in its commitment towards all Indians.
• Read this article to understand why the government’s estimation of OOPE is inaccurate.

To claim forest rights under the FRA, the applicant must have occupied the land on or before December 13, 2005. Additionally, other communities that are traditionally dependent on the forest should have lived there for at least three generations. Forest rights claims are investigated first at the gram sabha level, then at the subdivisional level, and finally at the district level. In the event of cancellation of the claim, the reason is recorded and the claimants are informed so that they can appeal against it. Generally, people who have been living on forest land for many generations, cultivating and benefitting from forest produce, and who depend on forests for their livelihood can claim forest rights under the FRA.

The current scenario

The Foundation for Ecological Security (FES) is an organisation that works to conserve land, water, forest resources, and pastures in the country. They also help Adivasi communities in claiming their forest rights. During a CFRR campaign conducted by FES in Chhattisgarh to raise awareness among gram sabhas, it was observed that, even after many years since the enactment of the FRA, it remains challenging for the government machinery to convey information about it to the gram sabhas. Better coordination and communication between three important departments—revenue, forest, and tribal affairs—is required for proper compliance of the FRA. Local organisations working at the grassroots level found it difficult to make much of a difference through their work because of these issues.

In such a situation, there are two options: Either people (or communities) can claim CFRR themselves or nonprofit organisations can contribute towards such efforts. Difficult legal language poses the first obstacle here. Implementation of any law becomes possible only when people possess knowledge and an understanding of it. This is where nonprofits such as FES have a role to play. FES has taken the initial step of simplifying legal language and making it more accessible to the general public, and outlines in eight steps what communities can do to achieve their forest rights.

What is the process of claiming forest rights?

1. Gram sabha meeting

People who meet the aforementioned criteria can come together to claim their community forest rights. To initiate this process, it is necessary to convene a gram sabha. During this meeting, decisions regarding applying for a CFRR claim and its approval are made. There are some areas that fall under the purview of community forest rights, which need to be differentiated from those that fall under individual rights. Details of the gram sabha proceedings and the topics discussed are communicated to the subdivisional level committee (SDLC). This gathering concurrently establishes the forest rights committee (FRC), tasked with overseeing and guiding the application procedure. The gram panchayat, particularly the panchayat secretary, supports the communities in this process. Following this, a core group is established to identify the traditional boundaries. To facilitate this, the chairman and secretary of the FRC issue a notice with the names of the core group members and details—including date, venue, and time—of the upcoming meeting.

However, there are certain challenges in this phase. Often, when the gram sabha convenes a meeting to put forward an FRA proposal, the panchayat secretary may not know about the event and thus is unable to contribute. Even if the panchayat secretary is present, there is no guarantee of their familiarity with the FRA or CFRR. Moreover, it is important to involve government representatives such as the patwari (village-level official) and forest guard, but this can be a complex task. The absence of a clear window for submission of the application at the block level further complicates matters, with different states or districts making their own arrangements. All these factors create significant obstacles for the gram sabha. People, communities, or nonprofit organisations demanding FRA should be prepared for the likelihood of navigating various block-level government offices throughout the entire process. These issues arise from the lack of a standardised system or order across most states.

2. FRC meeting

The second stage is the FRC meeting that is held to initiate the claims process. During this meeting, the steps and methods of claims preparation are discussed and responsibilities of the various tasks are distributed among people, who are then accountable to the FRC and the core group.

If you are a nonprofit associated with FRA, you must ensure that the volunteers involved in these efforts are from the same community that you are working with. Based on their on-ground experience, experts assert that, so far, professionals have not succeeded in making this happen. If we simply consider the example of language, we find that many words and terms are different in different regions. In such a situation, adapting the process and giving responsibilities to people keeping in mind the regional language and traditions can offer better results.

3. Visual map of village boundaries

Generally, the people living in a village know how far their village extends; often they have their own symbols to estimate the boundary of the village.

In this third step, the FRC, together with the core group and representatives of all the bordering villages, determine the boundaries of the village. Village elders, women, and people with traditional, local knowledge participate in this. In Chhattisgarh, these communities include the Vaidyas, Sirahas, and Charvahas. The FRC also calls the forest department’s beat guard, the patwari, and the panchayat secretary, who are sent information about this (in the format 5C prescribed by the government). In the presence of all these representatives, a visual map of the boundaries, a list of forest resources, and a claims form are prepared. A claims register is maintained to keep track of all the information regarding these claims.

There are challenges during this phase as well. As mentioned above, while working on the FRA, it is important to have an understanding of the area as well as the people living there and their traditions. If we consider the example of creating a visual map, in Bastar, a temple might be regarded as the boundary, whereas in Jaspur it could be something different. The traditions or beliefs of a village may vary from those of its neighbouring village, a factor that both communities and nonprofit organisations should acknowledge. Failure to do so often results in border disputes, which are then resolved by the SDLC.

4. No objection certificate

Before claims are sent to the SDLC for verification, maps are prepared taking the boundaries into account. To make these maps, the forest department’s GPS machine is used. At this stage, a problem that often arises is the unavailability of the GPS machine. In such circumstances, using a mobile phone may seem an option, but it is not recommended since government departments do not recognise the information obtained this way. Furthermore, the availability of smartphones in remote forest areas is an issue.

In addition to the map, other evidence, such as statements from elders of neighbouring villages and no objection certificates from the FRCs of those villages, is also obtained to confirm that the boundary has been accurately determined, and that they have no objections to it. Once the boundary is established, the FRC communicates this information to the SDLC, requesting them to send their representatives for verification. Additionally, documents that confirm the community’s use of forest land are collected.

5. Verification group

In the next stage, the SDLC sends a group to verify the claims and documents. The members of the group examine all the evidence related to community forest rights and submit the verification report before the SDLC. It is the responsibility of the FRC to present these before the gram panchayat.

6. Presentation of prepared claims to the gram sabha

The next step is to present the claims to the gram sabha. The details of all the decisions and consent documents of the gram sabha are prepared and recorded in a proposal register. After taking the signatures of all the members, a copy is kept in the forest rights claims register. It is sent to the SDLC in the format prescribed by the government, along with all the necessary documents.

7. Subdivisional level committee

The SDLC, after receipt of the claims, gives an acknowledgment with the date to the concerned gram sabha. After this, it investigates the claims at its own level and, if found correct, sends them to the district level committee (DLC).

8. District level committee

In the final stage, if the forest rights claims are found to be valid, the DLC issues authorisation letters to recognise and publish the claims after finalising the details.

If you are a nonprofit organisation, what do you need to keep in mind?

Those leading CFRR campaigns in Odisha, Jharkhand, and Telangana have experienced that securing forest rights depends a lot on how the government machinery of a state works. During their efforts, the organisations have to first keep in mind that this is a central government law, that is, it is uniform across the country. This means that no state can make its own changes in the provisions or in the way it is implemented. It is also often seen that stakeholders such as the panchayat secretary do not know how to implement this law. Cooperation with government departments is necessary in whichever area one is working in. Moreover, it should be noted that the government often has limited field staff. Therefore, efforts should aim to enhance communication and coordination among various departments such as tribal affairs, forest, and revenue, with the goal of strengthening compliance. Efforts can be initiated at the district level by identifying resource persons, building their capacity, and then connecting them with communities. Nonprofits and resource persons should be prepared to form partnerships with government departments and work with them to implement the law. Only after this can organisations proceed to the stage where they inform people about the process to claim forest rights.

The steps of the process are taken from here.

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Know more

• Learn how a women-led forest stewardship scheme in Odisha strengthened the FRA.
• Read this article to learn how the Forest Conservation Rule 2022 weakens the power of the gram sabha.
• Learn how the limitations of the FRA have consequences on forest-dwelling communities in Himachal Pradesh.

Over the last couple of years, initiatives aimed to bring millets back into our diets, and therefore, in the fields, have been in full swing. No longer perceived as an inferior coarse grain, millets are now considered to be planet-friendly, and nutritious. The recent focus has very much been on altering the behaviour of urban consumers who can afford to buy these products. But how is the rest of India to eat millets then, especially given its current price points, and accessibility?

This is where India’s Public Distribution System (PDS), with its scale and vast network of food distributors, can play a role in bringing millets to the masses. By controlling the affordability of essential products such as grains and pulses, the PDS influences how people eat, and what they choose to eat. Recognising the nutritional value of millets and the importance of supporting millet growers, the government of India has begun bolstering production and distribution of millets through public systems.

In Odisha, WASSAN (Watershed Support Services and Activities Network), in partnership with the state government, is working to reintroduce millets into people’s diets through already available public structures such as the PDS and Mid-day Meal Scheme.

“A demand for millets can’t be created solely through value-added products catered to urban consumers,” says Ashima Chaudhary, formerly the program manager at WASSAN, “It has to be done through bulk consumption for the masses.” According to her, there has to be more proactive encouragement of the bulk consumption of millet grains, like what was done for rice and wheat in the past.

At the moment, only ragi (finger millet), jowar (sorghum), and bajra (pearl millet) are procured by the government, and made available through the PDS. Minor millet varieties such as little millet are being considered for inclusion in the PDS in Odisha and Madhya Pradesh, as well as Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. However, initiatives to include minor varieties are being carried out as pilots by local NGOs, and have not been incorporated into state policy yet.

Before the conversation around including minor millets in public distribution surfaced, states like Karnataka, Odisha, Telangana, and Meghalaya had already begun distributing single-coated millets—mostly ragi—at PDS outlets on a pilot basis. Tamil Nadu has only recently begun expressing an interest in-state millet mission; in the select districts of Dharmapuri and Nilgiris, ragi is available in fair price shops on a pilot basis.

The Karnataka government has been striving to make millet varieties more accessible through the PDS, especially given that ragi and jowar are commonly consumed in different belts of the state. However, the realities of executing this through the state’s millet mission, led by MLA Krishna Byregowda, have been far more complex.

Although subsidised, millets are still too costly

The National Food Security Act, 2013 (NFSA) insists that eligible households are to receive 5 kg of foodgrains per person per month, with rice at Rs. 3 per kg, wheat at Rs. 2, and coarse grains at Rs.1; millets are considered to be coarse grains. Millets—largely ragi—were suddenly being mainstreamed and made cheaper than rice through the NFSA.

In 2019, the Odisha government began providing ragi at a subsidised rate in seven districts (Gajapati, Kalahandi, Kandhamal, Koraput, Nuapada, Malkangiri, and Rayagada). In six of these, cardholders would now be able to buy 1 kg of ragi for Rs. 1 every month. Only in Malkangiri district, the government provided 2 kg of ragi at Rs.1 per kg, due to more widespread consumption in the area. Chaudhary says that these prices hold true for Odisha today as well. By making ragi affordable and accessible through fair price shops, the Odisha government is effectively beginning to connect PDS beneficiaries to grains beyond rice and wheat.

Although the push for coarse grains such as ragi has been initiated in policy, its implementation reflects a different reality. While millets have been subsidised and made available through the PDS, rice remains cheaper in most states.

Lakshmi Narayanan from the Keystone foundation, which works with indigenous communities in the Nilgiris biosphere, observed a similar pattern during his fieldwork in the Pillur region in the Nilgiris district in Tamil Nadu. He says, “Although ragi is available in fair price shops, it still costs more than rice which is available for 3-5 rupees per kg and free of cost for tribal communities.”

Narayanan shares that before the Covid-19 pandemic, families in non-urban areas in the Nilgiris would grow their own ragi, eating it with rice. During the pandemic though, unable to purchase ragi seeds and farm them, beneficiary households became entirely dependent on the rice provided in the PDS.

The general health of tribal communities in the Nilgiris has deteriorated in the past five years, and they attribute this to excess rice consumption.

Even now, fair price shops in Tamil Nadu provide only ragi millet at a subsidy. Other millets indigenous to the region, such as kambu (pearl millet), solam (sorghum), and thinai (foxtail) varieties, which traditionally comprised parts of the Irula tribe’s diet—one of the tribal communities living in the Nilgiris district—have completely disappeared from their plates. At present, when families do eat millets, which is mostly during festivals and special occasions, they only consume ragi.

“The general health of tribal communities in the Nilgiris has deteriorated in the past five years, and they attribute this to excess rice consumption,” Narayanan adds.

Processing millets, a major challenge

Ragi, bajra, and jowar are also easier to distribute through the PDS given that they are naked grains which require minimal processing. Ragi, for example, can be ground more easily, and households often use traditional milling methods to produce ragi flour which is easy to cook and consume. While processing ragi may be relatively easier, the need for processing itself poses a barrier to consumption. For instance, in Tamil Nadu, ragi grains were traditionally hand ground into flour. However, this is no longer the practice, and people tend to rely on machinery, ranging from pulverisers to grinders.

Dr. Israel Oliver King, the director of MS Swaminathan Research Foundation (MSSRF) further contextualises the discourse around processing millets. With many having resorted to ad-hoc mechanisms of cleaning and grinding the single-coat ragi into a flour, minor miller varieties are even harder to process. Dr. King shares that minor millets— which have multiple coats to their seed—require specific machinery like dehullers, in order to make them cookable. Dehullers being expensive and hard to access, states largely focus on the millets that are easier to process.

However, in remote areas in the Nilgiris, Narayanan finds that people have little access to even seemingly basic machines, and travel long distances into the plains to process ragi grain. Understandably, the cost and time associated with this journey discourages people from buying millets. It is so much easier to just eat rice.

The introduction of millets through the PDS and fair price shops needs to be supported by adjacent milling systems

In Odisha, collective memories around eating millets are still relatively fresh. So, when ragi was introduced through the PDS in 2019, people were receptive to the prospect of including it in their diet, finds Chaudhary. However, there is little widespread knowledge, especially among newer generations, of how to treat the millet grain.

The introduction of millets through the PDS and fair price shops needs to be supported by adjacent milling systems—similar to local rice mills and atta chakkis—where millets can be processed easily, at low cost, and close to home.

Further, processed millets have a short shelf life, unlike rice and wheat, and can only be supported through an efficient local system of processing and distribution. In this regard, the government of Odisha has successfully championed local production, processing, and distribution through the Odisha Millet Mission, losing only little of the precious grain to spoilage.

Reimagining millets as aspirational

In Odisha, WASSAN has observed that people want to consume higher quality grains, in terms of grain grade as well as the micronutrient richness, and enjoy diversity in their diets. This is especially true for older generations, who distinctly remember eating a variety of millets. 

However, as tastes change, promotion of these grains must change as well. Chaudhary finds that younger generations are not interested in traditional dishes such as jaur—a fermented porridge made with rice and ragi flour. Building awareness early through campaigns in schools and anganwadis can help portray millets as aspirational and tasty.

Through the Odisha Millet Mission, the state has been working to provide and promote millets to children. This includes ragi laddoos as morning snacks for children in anganwadis under the Integrated Child Development Services, and promotional events featuring millet dishes for children to taste.

But taste can be a knotty subject, as Lakshman Kalasapudi—adjunct professor of Anthropology at Rowan university—found. In his research in Srikakulam District in Northern Andhra Pradesh under the Revitalising Small Millets in South Asia project in 2010, Kalapasudi observed that many viewed millets positively.

The residents of the village perceived millets—mainly ragi—as healthy, strong, easy to grow, and tastier than ‘quota rice’ or rice provided through the PDS. Kalapasudi hypothesises that the local government’s push for millets, supported by non-governmental groups such as WASSAN, played a significant role in promoting millets as a worthy group to include in one’s diet.

At the same time, millets were also associated with moments of scarcity, famine, and hunger—as food eaten by the poor. “[The respondents] recalled millets as food eaten due to lack of choice, rather than a desire to eat them,” says Kalapasudi. The tension between millets being tasty and a source of nutrition, and simultaneously a food of compulsion suggests many conflicting ideas surrounding millets—while the notion of millets as the poor person’s food may be traced back to introduction of rice as aspirational in the 1980s, the reimagining of millets as aspirational is a more recent phenomenon of the 2010s.

Thinking back to his fieldwork, Kalapasudi shared that millets were remembered by those in the village in a sing-song voice. “Finger millet, foxtail, barnyard, pearl millet, sorghum, and little millet were spoken about together, in one breath.” Although most millet varieties are rarely eaten in Srikakulam district today, ragi is still ardently consumed in the form of ragi ambali—ragi malt with buttermilk.

Karnataka, a pioneer in introducing millets in the PDS, also illustrates this complexity. Dr. King recounts, “Traditionally a millet-eating state, with the Northern district known as the sorghum belt and the Southern district the ragi belt, the uptake of millets from the PDS was surprisingly low.” A study conducted on this reveals that the low acceptance can be attributed, to some extent, to the existing abundance of millet in people’s fields and plates.

“Since farmers in the state are already producing millets, there is enough for their self-consumption and surplus for sale,” he adds.

While trying to understand the acceptance of millets in the PDS, it is these complexities and contrasting notions that have been most, often alone, glaring. As millets are mainstreamed, it is difficult to ignore how tenuous existing relationships with millets are. Or, what it stood for in the past. Our eating and purchasing behaviours reveal a tumultuous journey, with a deep dissonance between cultural imaginations of the grain as inferior to rice, and their recent resurgence as a super-grain.

Has the inclusion of millets in the PDS been a success? In a system where a historically sidelined grain is pitted against rice and wheat, we are ill-equipped to even ask such a question.

This article was originally published on The Locavore website, in partnership with Rainmatter Foundation.

Beyond the numbers of elected representatives, decentralised governance is one of the indicators of commitment to deepening democracy, by taking governments closer to people and opening up formal spaces for citizen engagement in governance. Yet, local governments continue to languish. Unless concrete steps are taken to build the capacity of local governments, their promise will not be realised. This needs urgent attention because when local governments don’t function as designed, it both leads to poor development outcomes as well as erodes the trust people have in governments.

Gram panchayats as a central but constrained actor

The central figure in this context is the gram panchayat (GP), which is typically a village council. However, GPs present both opportunities and constraints. The opportunities stem from the fact that the representatives at the GP level (the elected committee comprising the pradhan/sarpanch and the ward members) are elected by voters. One could thus argue that the people’s will and aspirations are legitimately represented within the institution. GPs have a firm basis (both in law and in popular perception) that enables them to play a leading role in prioritising the needs of communities and planning and implementing key government schemes related to housing, livelihoods, water, energy access, etc.

However, the institutional constraints that GPs face are equally daunting. Local planning processes, although mandated by law, are not translated into practice. Often where they are carried out, local plans do not reflect in budgeted interventions, as they are undermined by weak institutional infrastructure or an apathetic higher level of government. For example, a report by the Standing Committee on Rural Development in 2018 observed a persistent and severe shortage of manpower in GPs. This inhibits their ability to deliver services and has a knock-on effect as funds from the central government are not released to GPs, partly because of their limited implementation capacity. The deficiencies in planning and budgeting processes, in the knowledge of rules and procedures around the flow of funds, and in staff with secretarial and technical or financial management skills mean that GPs can hardly function as representative spaces for democracy at the local level or as effective providers of public services.

This has huge implications, both in terms of the quality of services delivered to citizens as well as the faith citizens put in the processes of local governance.

A conversation in Odisha

A recent conversation in Odisha on sustainable development brought home the importance of effective GPs.¹ Rural communities in Odisha rely on a mix of land- and forest-based livelihood activities and labour migration. Over the last two decades, there has been visible improvement in the state of infrastructure such as roads, communication services, and schools and hospitals. However, economic opportunities are limited and nearly every household has to supplement its income from agriculture or local market activities with income from labour migration to southern and western India. While labour migration can be a reliable source of household income, it is still considered an undesirable (if inevitable) choice, given the health risks and the social challenges of integrating with local communities in other parts of the country, and the separation from one’s own family. The question then arose: Would young men (who made up a bulk of the migrants) not migrate if there were better economic opportunities for them back home? The response to this question, when posed to the people I spoke with, was overwhelmingly positive.

In rural Odisha, water and natural resource security is both a means and an end.

Further, one of the clear strands that emerged was that the quality of natural resources and the availability of water in habitations are a key determinant of the standard of their lives. In rural Odisha, water and natural resource security is both a means and an end. The set of individual and collective actions required to achieve this goal are a way of encouraging greater civic participation and local self-governance. At the same time, year-round availability of water for drinking, other household uses, and agriculture and other livelihood activities would lead to a better quality of life. 

In remote rural parts of the country, local governments have a significant role in helping achieve water security and managing natural resources effectively and equitably. GPs should organise gram sabhas (village assemblies) to involve citizens in regular needs assessment and planning processes, and be able to aggregate these plans and submit them to the respective agencies upstream. This will require coordination and technical inputs from ground-level officials of line departments. They should be able to then map out and utilise available government programmes, such as the Jal Jeevan Mission (JJM), or other projects on irrigation or watershed development effectively to design and implement land and water management activities at scale. GPs should support the emergence of local user groups and resource management committees. They should also coordinate with one another to access funds for agricultural support and market-linkage interventions. In this way, they will be playing a central role in the lives of communities in their jurisdiction. However, the weaknesses that I describe above—the lack of skilled resources, being underfunded and undermined by higher levels of government, etc.—take away from the GPs’ ability to play their role.

Unlocking the potential of gram panchayats

Reforms in local government should be aimed at enabling GPs to develop further as self-governed spaces. This requires a sustained effort that combines capacity-building support to local government institutions on the ground along with advocacy efforts with the state government to expand their mandate.

Notwithstanding the differences in their development histories, GPs in Kerala provide an important model that other states could attempt to emulate. GPs in Kerala played an important role in the management of COVID-19 at the height of the pandemic in India. They led from the front in spreading awareness, identifying cases, and taking local containment measures and stayed in touch with individuals and families who had to be isolated. Drawing on the success of local governments in Kerala, here are three areas of support that should be taken up urgently:

1. Establish gram sabhas as a forum for debate and discussion

This would help formalise people’s participation and joint planning. In order to do this, it is important to concurrently enhance awareness and build faith among people about the GP as an effective government that would be of use to them. Further, GPs should conduct needs assessment exercises at the gram sabhas, develop plans and projects that can be aggregated at the district level, and provide inputs to the state’s annual budgeting process. Technical and line department staff participating in gram sabhas should reinforce the primacy of these assemblies, confirming that gram sabha decisions cannot be simply overruled by higher levels of government.

 2. Build the capacity and skills of GP staff

A close second would be to revisit the functions and powers of GPs and push for them to have the kind of technical and support staff required for them to fulfil their mandate. The 11th schedule in India’s Constitution has 29 subjects (specifying powers and functions) that are to be devolved to local governments. A paper on Jharkhand provides one such example, where GP staff can play an active role in improving the effectiveness of social programmes, and, needless to say, the technical and secretarial staff of GPs have to be managed by the elected representatives at the local level. In general, GPs should be able to exert control over their staff and their service rules.

 3. Leverage alternate local sources of revenue

The third priority is to work on own-source revenue for GPs, such as local taxes and levies, as well as with market actors to identify and develop enterprises at the local level that may be based on the basic services that GPs are expected to perform—such as water supply, solid waste management, and roads. Own-source funds are in addition to the funds that GPs receive from the Union Government’s Finance Commission and the State Finance Commission. While it is relatively easy to track fiscal transfers that flow from the state or the Centre, it is much harder to do so for data on own-source revenues due to poor accounting and record-keeping practices, which is a result of lack of skilled staff—this, therefore, could be the first port of call within this area.

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Footnotes:

1. I spent a week with a large and diverse group of development sector professionals who had gathered to exchange ideas and experiences on sustainable rural development in eastern India. This group had been brought together by Gram Vikas, a nonprofit that has been working in Odisha since 1979. The group comprised a wide range of organisations and individuals (implementers, foundations, researchers, technocrats) with several decades of collective experience in development work that spanned every district in Odisha.

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Know more

• Read this article to know more about women’s participation in gram panchayats.
• Read this article to find out about how India’s local governance structure need reform.
• Read this article to find out how a group of gram panchayats in Odisha voted against liquor sale.

As we near the tapering end of the population growth period, with rise in life expectancy and faster decline in fertility rates, India is experiencing one of the fastest ageing populations and share of older people are expected to rise (8.6% in 2011 to 21% in 2050).

By 2031, elderly count will be 194 million in 2031, compared to 138 million in 2021. The growing older people are posing significant challenges for social welfare, economic and health policies in India. 

Growing share of the oldest-old 

Even more concerning are the trends in the population growth of different age groups among the elderly. The share of elderly aged 80 years and above, in total population, was 0.4% in 1950; which was doubled (0.8%) in 2011 and is expected to increase up to 3.3% by 2050. These demographic shifts indicate a rapid transformation of India’s population composition, where elderly citizens will constitute a significant portion of the total population and it imposes multi-faced challenges form a policy formation point of view especially health care, economic, social and emotional support provision.

Two major challenges associated with increasing ageing population are the health of and the care-giving to the elderly. As age is a predominant determinant of deterioration of health, it limits an individual’s economic productivity, increases chronic morbidity and need for care. An article recently published in The Lancet using their new measure “health adjusted dependency ratio” states that the elderly are largely dependent on others due to their poor health rather than for economic reasons.  

Disability and functional limitations

Mobility associated disabilities are almost inevitable after attaining a certain age. Complete immobility in older ages necessitates round-the-clock assistance to carry out activities of daily living. The latest Longitudinal Ageing Study in India reports that, around 44% of elderly aged 80 years have some kind of activity limitation either in bathing, dressing, eating, using the toilet, getting out of bed or walking across the room.

The numbers from the recent National Sample Survey also suggest that just among 70 years and above population, around 44 lakh elderly are completely bed ridden. Moreover, the number is much higher (19% for elderly aged 80 years above) if we count those who may not be completely bed-ridden but are confined to homes. These numbers can increase to an alarming level in the coming years owing to the rate of population ageing in the country. 

With the advent of a longer life span, there would be a substantial increase in the need for care as elderly population are more vulnerable to possess poor health and non-communicable diseases. Consequently, these multiple health issues contribute to a growing dependence of the elderly upon the younger population as well as on the state for economic, healthcare services and physical support. 

Who will care for the elderly: A big future concern

Hitherto, a majority of living support for elderly had come from children. Only 6% of individuals aged 60 years and above live alone, while 20% live only with their spouse without the presence of their children, but this number can increase significantly in the coming days and might pose a big challenge for household-based informal care-giving. 

In particular, with declining birth rate, migration of young children for education and jobs, splitting of families with growing individuality and the consequent rise in left-behind elderly is a great threat to informal care support for the older population. More importantly, a rise in longer life span for females and growing number of widows pose a serious challenge for later age support for them. Thus, in the future, absence of adequate informal caregivers would significantly hamper the elderly’s access to essential services, particularly for those with poor health conditions.

Among the existing provision of formal care, a few urban based NGOs have started different start-ups aiming to provide support for different instrumental activities to elderly. But they are restricted to the metropolises, as well as expensive. However, a majority of the elderly (70%) live in rural areas and they are financially more dependent on their family and the state. 

The way forward

To address the increasing unmet need of care for elderly, a crucial step would be to reduce their complete dependency on household members; for financial and day-to-day living support. Moreover, a stronger pension scheme, social security system and affordable health care system can share the burden of over-dependency on family-based care.

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) has rightly initiated a programme for training and skilled building geriatric care assistance for hospital, home/old age home based specialised care-giving. Launching and scaling-up of an integrated geriatric health care system can serve as step in the right direction in the longer run. In the meantime, providing affordable options to hire formal care givers can provide a quicker short-term solution to existing needs. However, the country needs to prepare itself for formal institutionalised care-giving services to the elderly, especially in the context of unavoidable and accelerating rise of the oldest-old and the physically disabled, sick and bed ridden older population.

A geriatric care-friendly health system, especially in the bottom layers of system (sub-centres, primary health centres and community health centres or in newly created health and wellness centres) can pave the way for creating a healthy and active elderly population in the country. 

This article was originally published on Science, The Wire.

However, even before this record-breaking month, India was not water-secure. Depleting groundwater reserves has been a very real threat for a long time now. The Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) estimates that groundwater in about a third of India’s blocks (an administrative unit within districts) is overexploited or critical or semi-critical. This means the rate at which water is extracted exceeds the limit or is close to the rate at which it is replenished.

Recognising this dire situation, the central government launched Atal Bhujal Yojana (ABY) in 2019. The scheme aims to address groundwater depletion and promote sustainable management practices by encouraging communities to prepare and implement water security plans in a participatory manner.

A field survey conducted by Water, Environment, Land and Livelihoods (WELL) Labs, an environmental research and innovation centre under the Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR), Krea University, in one of the ‘overexploited’ blocks in southern Karnataka, in a village called Nonavinakere, led to an important finding. The water budgeting process carried out under the ABY scheme by the gram panchayat failed to account for imported surface water, i.e. water that flows into the region through canals, but originates from outside the village’s jurisdiction. The interdependence between surface water and groundwater is a missing piece that must factored in for more effective water management.

Atal Bhujal Yojana’s water budgeting exercise

The primary objective of Atal Bhujal Yojana is to enhance groundwater management and mitigate depletion in areas where it is already overexploited, such as Nonavinakere in Karnataka’s Tumkur district. The programme adopts a decentralised and community-led approach, that involves gram panchayats, water user associations and local communities. It promotes groundwater conservation and recharge, improving water usage efficiency and strengthening institutional frameworks for sustainable groundwater management.

Water budgeting serves as a critical planning tool for effective water resource management.

A central aspect of the programme involves formulating and implementing a community-led water security plan at the panchayat level. This plan involves a detailed assessment of the groundwater balance specific to the panchayat, and is derived from measurements of available water resources and how much is used. Based on this water balance analysis, potential interventions for water management are proposed, with the goal of sustaining groundwater resources. This entire process is referred to as ‘water budgeting’.

Water budgeting serves as a critical planning tool for effective water resource management. First, it provides a comprehensive evaluation of water resources in a village, offering valuable insights into water source availability and utilisation. By identifying areas where water consumption exceeds availability, it highlights potential imbalances.

Second, it plays a vital role in identifying problems and generating solutions. By determining the major water consumers and activities, it brings attention to key stakeholders who can contribute to finding sustainable solutions. Water budgeting acts as an early warning mechanism for these stakeholders.

Finally, water budgeting also facilitates the development of a meticulous water management plan, enabling informed decision-making and proactive measures to tackle water-related challenges. The official guidelines for the preparation of the Water Security Plan, also known as ‘groundwater budgeting’, provide a comprehensive overview of all factors that need to be considered.

However, a significant gap exists in the section regarding water availability. Currently, the calculation of water availability takes into account rainfall, groundwater, and the static volume of surface water bodies. This approach overlooks the replenishment of these water bodies and the surface water imported through canals for irrigation and other purposes.

Nonavinakere’s water balance

According to the signboard displayed at the Nonavinakere Gram Panchayat, the water balance prepared under the Atal Bhujal Yojana scheme indicates a negative value of -823.46 Ha-m, based on how much water is available and how much is used by different sectors.

However, on-field observations and secondary information cast doubt on this data. The panchayat has a large Nonavinakere lake (tank) that is fed by water from its catchment area and the Hemavathi canal system.

The lake serves as an irrigation source for around 500 hectares (ha) of agricultural land in the village and surrounding areas. During the post-monsoon period of 2021-22, the lake spanned 410 ha, which later decreased to 226 ha in April, before the onset of monsoon. Even in the lean season, the lake contained approximately 1133.3 Ha-m of water, significantly surpassing the negative water balance reported in the Atal Bhujal Yojana plan.

Both the panchayat office and villagers verified that the lake consistently receives water from the Hemavathi canal system, indicating a higher availability of water. While this information is fragmented, it sufficiently establishes that the village has more water available than what is reported in the Atal Bhujal Yojana plan.

Furthermore, data from the programme’s website shows an increase in groundwater levels from 16.6 metres below ground level (mbgl) in 2016 to 5.46 mbgl in 2022.

The local residents claim that they had seen the upward trend in the water level after the lake’s rejuvenation, higher-than-average rainfall from 2020 to 2022, and water from the Hemavathi canal system.

These factors indicate that the water security plan made under Atal Bhujal Yojana does not accurately represent the ground reality.

Imported surface water 

Including surface water in water balance and budgeting exercises within a groundwater management programme is crucial for two important reasons.

First, excluding surface water from calculations results in an incomplete water scenario. Surface water is utilised in various sectors, such as irrigation, yet it is not accounted for in availability assessments. This omission can lead to a negative water balance, as it has in Nonavinakere, which may not reflect the actual situation. Failing to establish an accurate water balance hinders the recognition of potential problems and suitable solutions. Moreover, an inaccurate representation fails to capture the attention of stakeholders and obstructs their active participation.

By excluding surface water from calculations, a holistic approach to water management cannot be achieved.

Second, the surface water and groundwater are interconnected and should be considered together. Let us consider a scenario where canal water is utilised for irrigation. The water used for irrigation eventually percolates the soil and recharges aquifers. In another instance, canal water is utilised to fill ponds, tanks or lakes. These water bodies contribute to aquifer recharge and enhance local groundwater sources. This is evident from the rise in groundwater level in Nonavinakere.

By excluding surface water from calculations, a holistic approach to water management cannot be achieved. It is essential to recognise the integral relationship between surface water and groundwater in order to ensure comprehensive water management practices.

There is a need for a paradigm shift geared towards integrating imported surface water flows. Nonavinakere is not an isolated case where incorrect methodologies have led to inadequate water management. Similar instances have been documented, with stakeholders advocating for necessary corrections. However, little progress has been made.

One possible counterargument to address in this article is that the Atal Bhujal Yojana focuses on sustainable groundwater management, which is why imported surface water is excluded from the methodology. However, it is crucial to recognise that groundwater, soil moisture, and surface water are integral parts of a single interconnected resource, demanding unified planning, management, and regulation. Surface water and groundwater are mutually dependent resources, often forming a hydrological continuum, where surface water bodies contribute to groundwater replenishment through natural processes like infiltration and recharge.

By considering surface water, we gain a better understanding of the dynamics of water availability, allowing us to identify potential recharge areas and develop strategies to harness the potential of both sources in a sustainable manner.

This critique focuses on the methodology of water budgeting in the Atal Bhujal Yojana, regardless of the data and its sources. Accounting for imported water is a complex task, as it interacts with rainfall, local water bodies, and aquifers, potentially leading to double accounting. However, acknowledging this challenge opens up the discussion and provides an opportunity to explore possible solutions.

When formulating water security plans for groundwater management in gram panchayats, it is crucial to recognise the significance of surface water resources. By adopting an integrated approach that considers the interdependence between surface water and groundwater sources, we can improve water availability, promote sustainable water management practices, and ensure the long-term resilience of our communities. It is high time we rectify the existing gaps and work towards a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to water management.

This article was originally published on Mongabay.

On our podcast On the Contrary by IDR, we spoke to K K Shailaja, former health minister of Kerala, and Liby Johnson, executive director of the nonprofit Gram Vikas. K K Shailaja has received national and global recognition for her leadership and handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Nipah virus outbreak in Kerala. Liby has more than 25 years of experience in grassroots and policy work and disaster management. He has coordinated Gram Vikas’s relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction activities after the 1999 Odisha super cyclone as well as after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

Liby and Shailaja talked about how a state’s geography and demographics collude to produce a unique set of challenges in each instance, what resilience means and how it can be achieved, the role of civil society, and, in the face of unknown disasters, what preparedness would involve.

Below is an edited transcript that provides an overview of the guests’ perspectives on the show.

Kerala and Odisha: A long history of disasters

Liby Johnson: Natural disasters have been affecting the state [of Odisha] for many years, and in the last five years or so we’ve had annual disaster events—cyclones or floods—recurring on an unprecedented scale. In the middle of [COVID-19] in 2021, a cyclone hit northeast and coastal Odisha. So, the last couple of years have been a struggle. The government of Odisha has put in place some serious, strong early warning systems and one of the advantages of that is the prevention of loss of life during cyclones and similar disasters. This is remarkable progress from what we saw during the 1999 super cyclone.

Odisha has one of the lowest rates of urbanisation in India.

However, 40 percent of Odisha’s population is from scheduled caste or scheduled tribe communities. Approximately two-thirds of the state’s geography is hilly with a large amount of forest cover. The coastal part, which is the remaining third half, has a high density of population and a varied occupational profile. Approximately one-third of Odisha’s GSDP comes from mining and mineral processing industries. So, there’s a lot of ongoing impact on natural resources, such as forests and water, on a daily basis. [There are] five large river basins and annual floods. [The state also has] one of the lowest rates of urbanisation in India, so the economy is very rural and agrarian. But agriculture contributes only 15–16 percent of the gross state product, which necessitates migration at a large scale.

All these factors make Odisha more vulnerable. [During COVID-19, for instance,] the state was not really prepared because of the absence of healthcare facilities at the lowest end. They did try to respond by making panchayats more responsible, but the Panchayati Raj system in Odisha is in its infancy, which compromises its ability to react rapidly.

K K Shailaja: I think Kerala faces the same situation as Odisha, and is also vulnerable to floods and hurricanes. The terrain is similar—with hilly areas and forests. We faced devastating floods in 2018 and 2019, and hurricanes such as Ockhi. There is an increase in pandemics too.

Socio-economically, things are comparatively better for Kerala—the state’s human development index is high because of social reforms such as the Land Reform Act, the total literacy mission, and decentralised planning. Kerala also has the lowest poverty rates in India. But at 860 per square kilometre, the population density is very high, which became a great threat during the pandemic. Lifestyle diseases—hypertension, diabetes, cancer—are also rampant and became a cause of worry during this period.

What does disaster preparedness entail?

1. Building resilience beyond the crisis

Liby Johnson: What Odisha learned from the 1999 super cyclone is how to prevent loss of life. There hasn’t been a double-digit death toll in Odisha due to any disasters that have occurred in the last few years. While that is remarkable, the response to a disaster is still very ad hoc and knee jerk. A lot of preparatory work happens—early warning systems go off, people are moved to cyclone shelters, the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) begins rescue and relief operations immediately. In everything else, whether it is immediate food relief or shelter support, there’s a lot of arbitrariness, [which is] very surprising considering all the experiences [the state has had]. And we still believe in techno-managerial solutions to all these problems. There are limits to [this approach] because it does not place citizens at the centre.

Resilience is long-term development and the ability of citizens to withstand the shock of an event. [For instance], people may have a majority of their wealth in perishable stocks such as food items and may not have [sufficient] bank balances. In addition, the difference between a family that has a bank balance and one that does not is very stark. So, we have to go back to the basics of development, and remove this aura around disasters as being something that is very different.

K K Shailaja: We think about [people] whenever an incident occurs, and that is not sufficient. To build back better does not mean to reproduce [the same structures] after the flood or the disaster—it means to build back such that people can face these kinds of difficulties.

2. Keeping citizens at the centre of planning and response

Liby Johnson: As a citizen, [when I think about] how I have been dealt with by my government, I get this strong feeling of being a class 2 child who has done something wrong, and of the state being the headmaster. There is this constant sense of worry, fear of the state. The state and the citizen have to be two adults dealing with each other; that is not what is happening. There is [more of] a parent–child relationship between the state and the citizen, especially in Odisha. What is the level of trust that a citizen has in her state, which is manifested either as a panchayat sarpanch, the district collector, or the chief minister?

I think a large number of people in Odisha have great faith in our chief minister to do right. But this is missing at the district level. At the panchayat level, the sarpanch may want to do a lot of things but her hands are tied because the kind of decentralisation that’s happened in Kerala has not happened in Odisha. The policing that happened during COVID-19 is not particularly helpful [in restoring citizens’ faith in authorities]. So [while] we keep the citizen at the centre, at the same time, [we need to ensure that we are] dealing with the citizen as an adult.

3. Focusing on decentralised systems

Liby Johnson: Kerala, Karnataka, and West Bengal are remarkable examples of having effectively managed local-level issues. This is because they followed the subsidiarity principle of institutional design and decision-making, wherein decentralisation was key—let the panchayat, not the collector, decide what it can do. We are now celebrating the silver jubilee of the decentralised planning campaign in Kerala. In 1996, when the Kerala government decided to financially empower panchayats, a lot of people called it money down the drain. But [it’s safe to say] that that’s not the case.

4. Bringing in technology in an inclusive manner

Liby Johnson: We need to bring in technology. However, a lot of new technology interventions are way beyond the average citizen’s reach; they need to be demystified. For instance, how do you make weather forecasts relevant for the farmer and her small plot? What we get is a block-level or district-level forecast, which to the small farmer doesn’t make a difference. How do we demystify it so that the last person can use it?

5. Strengthening primary healthcare and information systems

Liby Johnson: [We need to] reverse what we are doing in the public health system today. Particularly in Odisha, where the focus is on building tertiary specialised care, we are neglecting primary health [systems]. Whether it is a natural disaster or a pandemic, or simple things such as malaria, which has now come back to forests, we cannot leave it to just the ASHAs and the ANMs. And there seems to be so much faith that we have put in our ASHA didis and ANM didis to solve primary health issues [on their own].

K K Shailaja: The pandemic taught us several lessons, [one of which is] that we should equip primary health centres to tackle these kinds of emergencies. We also equipped our laboratories to diagnose diseases earlier, and started improving the secondary- and tertiary-level hospitals. The government now has good operation theatres and wards, with an increased number of beds.

[We also learned that] for pandemics, we should train [healthcare providers] in early detection of the diseases. And we are making people aware about pandemics and diseases. [During COVID-19,] we started [using] the slogan ‘My health is my responsibility’. We are teaching people how to live with the pandemic and infectious diseases.

6. Inculcating partnerships with civil society organisations

Liby Johnson: There were times in Odisha when nonprofits were probably the strongest agents of last-mile social welfare delivery, including disaster relief, or rehabilitation and reconstruction. I remember, in 1999, Gram Vikas worked on rehabilitation and reconstruction for four years after the super cyclone. The state had a very minimal role. That was not the case in 2013, after Cyclone Phailin, when grantmakers played second fiddle to the government as a socio-technical partner, with the state government taking the main role in reconstruction. However, after the 2018 Cyclone Titli or the 2019 Cyclone Fani, [civil society] was not required as a technology or social partner because the state seemed to believe that it could do well on its own.

Odisha also needs organisations to strengthen the panchayat systems.

The state is now providing financial assistance to individual households, and people are making suboptimal habitat planning choices. Habitat planning, that is, designing individual houses as part of the larger environment and keeping in mind public common spaces, has gone completely out of the window. [This is happening] across Odisha—following disasters, individual houses are being built better, but this is not the case for the habitat. This calls for specific skills and technology orientation, of the kind that nonprofits and civil society organisations bring with them.

Odisha also needs organisations to strengthen the panchayat [systems], and this cannot happen by giving more powers to the sarpanch. [Panchayats become stronger] when the citizen–panchayat interface is strengthened. Given the large spread and remote[ness] of locations, and the wide variety in people’s education [levels], [the state] needs a catalyst—[it needs] facilitating organisations. And unfortunately, unlike Kerala and some other states, Odisha does not have a history of people’s movements such as the literacy mission or the social reform movements. So, one has to go back to existing civil society organisations to do that. And that is the nature of partnership we need to bring in.

You can listen to the full episode here.

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Know more:

• Read this article to learn why persons with disabilities are more vulnerable during disasters.
• Read this report by the Ministry of Home Affairs, India, and the UNDP on the state of disaster management in India.
• Learn more about the impact of climate change on disasters.